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A quality level is much often determined ahead of price. In imperfectly competitive 
markets, quality decisions are known to create the rival’s price undercutting, and thus the 
equilibrium quality level becomes suboptimal. This paper takes a view that a quality level of 
a product subject to network externalities is positively related to its degree of compatibility 
to other brands as well as to the size of its own network. It shows that in the presence of 
network externalities, contrary to the literature, the suppliers tend to provide an excessive 
degree of compatibility because compatibility provision relaxes subsequent price competition. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well-known that markets hardly generate an efficient incentive for quality 
provision in general. Two sources of market inefficiency of quality provision have been 
identified. One was pointed out by Spence (1975) with a monopoly model. He argued 
that market failure can occur due to the divergence between consumers’ marginal and 
average valuations of quality. His analysis is that the social planner takes care of the 
effect of an increase in quality on all consumers, while a profit-maximizing firm 
considers that only on the marginal consumer. Hence, the social optimum is not easily 
achieved by the market. 
Ma and Burgess (1993) detected the other source of inefficiency of quality provision 
with a duopoly model and with a linear demand function where the Spence effect is 
eliminated. Considering the two-stage game in which firms’ quality choices precedes 
price decisions, they note that if a firm arranges a higher quality level, then a rival firm 
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with a lower quality product tends to set a lower price in order for not losing its market 
share in the price competition subgame. Thus, they contend that a firm’s incentive for 
quality improvement is dampened by the rival firm’s price undercutting behavior which 
depresses the returns to quality investment, thereby leading to underinvestment. 
Furthermore, they show that when they choose prices and quality levels concurrently, 
firms can supply socially efficient quality levels. This is because quality choice is not 
used strategically to have an effect on price decision. 
This paper examines the effect of firm’s effort for enhancing the value of a product 
for consumers on the subsequent price competition, and then compares the market 
performance for such an effort to the social optimum. In this paper, the market under 
consideration is subject to network externalities. Since the network size - the number of 
consumers who purchase a similar product - directly affects a consumer’s utility in the 
presence of network externalities, it can be regarded as a determinant of the value of the 
product, although it is not exactly the same as the product quality dealt in Spence (1975) 
and Ma and Burgess (1993). 
In particular, the paper takes a view that the size of network enjoyed by consumers is 
often positively related not only to the network size of its own product but also to that of 
other products if those products are compatible each other. That is, the higher degree of 
compatibility yields the higher benefit to consumers. In this sense, a value of a product 
subject to network externalities relies crucially on degree of compatibility in the industry 
under consideration. 
The issue of compatibility in the presence of network externalities has been the 
subject of many recent studies. Among them, Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), Katz and 
Shapiro (1985, 1986, 1992), Economides (1989), Chou and Shy (1990), and Choi (1994) 
discuss trade-off between variety and standardization of the competing networks. 
While most articles deal with the polar cases of full compatibility and complete 
incompatibility, many industries such as software, system integration, and home 
entertainment are characterized by partial compatibility. A few authors, Farrell and 
Saloner (1992), Chou and Shy (1993)
1, and De Palma, Leruth, and Regibeau (1999), 
explicitly introduce partial compatibility when the products are subject to network 
externalities, and describe the market equilibria. 
While the degree of compatibility between the products generating their own 
networks is exogenously given in the literature, many suppliers like software writers, in 
reality, choose the degree of compatibility. For instance, in the word processing software 
industry, Microsoft makes its Word file only imperfectly translated into a WordPerfect 
file. In the personal computer industry, Apple has MacIntosh computers only run some 
Windows application software. In the ATM networks of banks, consumers with a card 
issued by a bank cannot enjoy all the services provided by the ATM networks of other 
 
1 Interestingly Chou and Shy (1993) define partial compatibility as the number of supporting services 
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banks.
2 Thus, it remains an open question why firms make their products compatible 
each other in a certain degree, and more interestingly, whether the degree of 
compatibility provided in a market achieves the social optimum. These are the important 
issues, because choices of compatibility directly affect a value of a product subject to 
network externalities when firms cannot choose their network sizes. 
For the analysis, I consider a simple duopoly market in which two firms produce the 
horizontally differentiated goods subject to network externalities. Each firm 
simultaneously chooses the degree of compatibility of its product at the first stage and 
then picks the price concurrently at the second stage. With this setting, I observe that the 
presence of network externalities alone sharpens price competition in the sense that the 
monopolistic power through product differentiation is diluted. Further, I find that 
introduction of compatibility can relax such fierce price competition. This is contrary to 
the common intuition saying that compatibility intensifies price competition by reducing 
product differentiation. 
To see this, suppose that there is no compatibility, implying that there is the maximal 
differentiation of the products in the horizontal sense. Since a value of a product is 
directly affected by the market share of the product, consumers wish to purchase the 
product with the bigger network size for not being stranded in a minor network, other 
things being equal. In other words, consumers are more sensitive to the changes in price 
which affect the market shares than in the absence of network externalities. When the 
products are compatible, however, consumers can reap some benefit from the other 
network size. This implies that they are not as much worried about being stranded in a 
minor network as with no compatibility. This in turn makes consumers less sensitive to 
the price change than with no compatibility. In addition, I find that a firm's provision of 
compatibility induces not only an increase of its own price but also that of rival firm’s 
price. The latter effect arises because unlike the case of no compatibility, a firm’s 
provision of compatibility imposes the importance on the network size of the competing 
brand, and because prices are strategic complements.   
From the perspective that provision of compatibility directly increases a value of a 
product for consumers, it is closely related to quality enhancement of a product. The 
price-enhancing effect created by provision of compatibility is in stark contrast to the 
literature on quality choices stating that a firm’s quality enhancement is counteracted by 
the rival’s price-undercutting reaction in the subsequent price game. Unlike the literature 
on product differentiation suggested, this result implies that when a market is subject to 
network externalities, relaxing price competition can be attained not by market 
segmentation nor by product differentiation but by making consumers not locked in a 
network so that they can share the benefit from other networks. 
Due to the price-enhancing effect of provision of compatibility, welfare analysis tells 
us that firms arrange an excessive degree of compatibility, although provision of 
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compatibility is costly. This is because provision of compatibility by the social planner 
does not create the price-enhancing effect. Since firms’ provision of compatibility is 
interpreted as quality improvement of their products, this inefficient result supports Ma 
and Burgess (1993) in that the sequential choices of quality and price is another source 
of inefficiency, but is obtained in a contrary way to Ma and Burgess (1993) who argue 
that quality improvement leads to price cuts from the rival firm, thereby resulting in 
underinvestment. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 then 
yields the equilibrium price. Section 4 compares the equilibrium degree of compatibility 
with the social optimum. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  THE  MODEL 
 
Consider a duopoly market in which two firms,  A and  B , produce differentiated 
products. Throughout the paper, I use a symmetric model where firms have identical 
cost structure. Each firm may make its product (partially) compatible with the rival’s 
brand. In particular, firm  { } can choose the degree of compatibility  [0, 1] 
where 0 stands for perfect incompatibility, and 1 represents full compatibility. However, 
provision of compatibility is costly, in that each firm pays 
∈ i B A, ∈ i α
( ) i C α  for choosing   
with  ,  , 
i α
() 0 > ⋅ ′ C () 0 > ⋅ ′ ′ C ( ) 0 lim 0 = ′ → i C
i α α , and  ( ) ∞ = ′ → i C
i α α 1 lim . The production 
cost of each firm is affected by the degree of compatibility, for example, through the 
fees of patents. The total cost of producing a quantity   with   for firm i  is 
, where   is the unit cost of the good with the degree of 
compatibility  , and is characterized as 
Q i α
() () i i C Q α α σ + () i α σ
i α () 0 > ⋅ ′ σ ,  () 0 > ⋅ ′ ′ σ ,  , and 
. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
()0 lim 0 = ′ → i i α σ α
()∞ = ′ → i i α σ α 1 lim ( ) ( ) . 0 0 0 = =C σ  The cost function 
implies that for each firm, higher degree of compatibility requires both higher marginal 
and fixed costs, and that two products are assumed to be technologically impossible for 
each firm to achieve the complete compatibility.   
There is a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed on a line of length 1. Each 
consumer buys one unit of any good. The firms’ products are subject to network 
externalities for consumers. Thus, consumer’s preference for a good consists of two 
components: stand-alone component and network component. A consumer indexed by 
∈ θ [0, 1] receives  θ a  for the stand-alone component if he purchases from firm  A, 
and   if he buys from firm  ( θ − 1 a ) B .  θ  can be interpreted as a consumer’s 
preference for the good produced by firm  A over the one by firm  B .   is assumed 
to be sufficiently large so that all consumers will buy one unit of a good produced by 
either 
a
A or  B . Let   denote the size of the network associated with the good 
produced by firm  . Then, from the network component, a consumer reaps   if he 
i X
i i X λCOMPATIBILITY COMPETITION  151 
purchases from firm  .  i λ  measures the importance of network benefits. Note that as 
long as the two products are (partially) compatible,    consists not only of the number 
of consumers purchasing from firm  , but also of some fraction of those buying from 
the other firm 
i X
i
j . The latter depends on  , the degree of compatibility chosen by firm 
. Denote by   the number of consumers who buy from firm  . Then, the size of 
network generated by product    is given by  , where  . Note 
also that provision of compatibility benefits consumers in that it enhances consumer’s 
utility level through network component.   
i α
i i Q i
i j i i Q Q X α + = { B A i j , ∈ ≠ }
Suppose that firm   imposes   for the price of its product. Furthermore, assume 
that consumers correctly conjecture the network sizes related to the products when 
deciding from which firm they purchase. Then, a consumer of type 
i i p
θ  gains 
  if he purchases from firm A, and reaps  () A A A A p X a p X u − + = λ θ θ ; ,
( ) B B B B p X a p X u − + − = λ θ θ 1 ) ; , (   if he purchases from firm  B , where  0 ≥ >λ a .
3  
The sequence of events is as follows. At Date 1, each firm chooses the degree of 
compatibility,  α , simultaneously. At Date 2, the firms pick their own prices at the same 
time. Finally, at Date 3, consumers purchase a product from either of the firms. The 
firms do not discount their expected profits. The subgame perfect equilibrium is adopted, 




As a benchmark, the socially optimal degree of compatibility will be found. Suppose 
that the social planner can explicitly enforce the degree of compatibility and the market 
share of each firm. Since technology and consumers preferences are symmetric, it is 
optimal to let each firm serve a half of all consumers. Then, the socially optimal degree 
of compatibility in a symmetric sense,  ( ) λ α
* , maximizes the sum of utilities of 
consumers served by each firm less the cost of (partial) compatibility provision: 
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Note that (1) implies that the social planner allows to choose a certain degree of 
compatibility, i.e., partial compatibility, if  0 > λ , and that the socially efficient degree 
of compatibility increases in  λ . 
 
 
3.  PRICE  COMPETITION 
 
With the result of the Date 3 consumer choice game, the demand function that firm 
 faces can be derived. Under the assumption that consumers correctly expect the 
network sizes while making a decision where to buy between the firms, let 
 define the index of the consumer who is just indifferent between 
buying from firms 
i
) , , , ( ˆ
B A B A p p X X θ
A  and  B  for  . This assumption 
means that the market is fully covered by the two firms. Then,   
a p p X X B A A B ≤ − + − | ) ( |λ
 
a
p p X X
p p X X B A A B
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λ
θ .                           ( 2 )  
 
In equilibrium, the consumers indexed by   buy from firm  ) , , , ( ˆ
B A B A p p X X θ B , 
and the rest of the consumers purchase from firm  A. From the definition of   and 
, for   the demand function firm   
faces is derived by   
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Now consider the Date 2 pricing game by the firms. Given   and  , firms 
simultaneously choose their prices to maximize their own profits. Firm  ’s profit 
function is  . Taking the derivative of 
firm  ’s profit function with respect to  , we can obtain price reaction functions. 
Then, the unique equilibrium prices charged by firm   and 
i α j α
i
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The equilibrium prices of (4) and (5) describe the effect of network externalities as 
well as that of provision of compatibility on price competition. The first parenthesis of 
the right hand side of both (4) and (5) tells us that price competition in the market 
subject to network externalities is severer than that in the non-network externality 
related market. It shows clearly that as long as  , the equilibrium prices strictly 
decrease in 
1 < i α
λ , which implies that the higher the consumers value the network 
component, the more intense price competition is. 
To see this, suppose that there is no compatibility,  . Since a consumer’s 
utility level of a product is directly affected by the market share of the product, 
consumers wish to purchase the product with the bigger network size for not being 
stranded in a minor network, other things being equal. Moreover, since the changes in 
prices affect the network sizes, consumers are more sensitive to the latter as the network 
benefit to consumers is more important. According to (3), it is easily seen that the 
demand function firm   faces is more elastic to price as the parameter measuring the 
network importance, 
0 = = j i α α
i
λ , is bigger.
4 Consequently, price competition relaxed through 
the maximal degree of horizontal differentiation is intensified when the market is subject 
to network externalities. Note that the result of Bertrand competition is obtained as a 
limiting case when  a → λ , even in the maximal degree of horizontal differentiation 
between the products. This result explains, for example, why almost free to use are the 
internet portal services in which network externalities are known to be much significant. 
The result obtained by (4) and (5) is contrary to the common intuition saying that 
compatibility intensifies price competition by reducing product differentiation. Put it 
differently, (4) and (5) tell us that provision of compatibility of the products can dampen 
such fierce price competition driven by network externalities.
5 There are two channels 
for relaxing price competition through provision of compatibility as follows. 
The terms with the second parenthesis of both (4) and (5) characterize the increased 
marginal cost effect created by each firm’s choice of degree of compatibility. Since the 
equilibrium price of a firm is positively affected by its own marginal production cost as 
well as by that of its rival firm, a higher degree of compatibility chosen by a firm raises 
not only its own equilibrium price but also that of the rival firm. This is because a higher 
degree of compatibility requires a higher marginal production cost and because the price 
reaction functions are strategic complements. 
The terms with the third parenthesis of both (4) and (5) depict the network 
externalities effect generated by provision of compatibility. The reason why this effect 
 
4 For  , 0 = α  the price elasticity of demand for firm i ,  , is reduced to 
. Thus, as 
) / /( ) / ( i i i i i p dp Q dQ − = ε
) /( i j i i p p a p − + − = λ ε λ   is bigger, the demand for a firm is more elastic to its price. 
5 Farrell and Saloner (1992) made a similar point with the model in which consumers can purchase a 
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can help the firms raise their prices is as follows. When the competing brands are 
(partially) compatible, consumers can reap some benefit from the other network size. 
This implies that consumers are not as much worried about being stranded in a minor 
network as with no compatibility. This in turn makes consumers less sensitive to the 
changes in prices than without compatibility. It is easily checked from (3) that the 
demand function for firm    gets less elastic to price as firm    chooses a higher degree 
of compatibility is higher.
i i
6
More importantly, the terms with the second parenthesis of (4) and (5) also present 
that a firm's provision of compatibility induces not only an increase of its own price but 
also that of rival firm’s price. In particular, the latter effect arises because unlike the case 
of no compatibility, a firm’s provision of compatibility imposes the importance on the 
network size of the competing brand. The second parenthesis of (4) and (5) imply that 
by providing compatibility, a firm has less incentive to steal the rival’s business than 
without compatibility, therefore can charge a higher price than without compatibility. 
The intuition behind this is as follows. 
Provision of compatibility increases the value that consumers impose on a product, 
because it can enlarge the network size of a product, which consumers are concerned 
about while deciding from which to purchase. Consumer’s willingness to pay increases 
in the degree of compatibility. Thus, a firm has an incentive to set a higher price with 
compatibility than without it.   
(4) and (5) also say that when a competing brand  j   is compatible with a product  , 
firm   can charge a higher price than otherwise, although it does not make its product 
compatible with the product 
i
i
j . As discussed above, firm  j ’s provision of 
compatibility makes the demand of the competing brand less elastic to the changes in its 
price, thereby increasing firm  j ’s price. This can raise firm  ’s demand, although firm  i
j ’s provision of compatibility reduces it directly. Moreover, the price increase of 
product  j  associated by firm  j ’s provision of compatibility positively affects the 
price of product   through  strategic  complements.   i
The same effects can be illustrated alternatively by writing the equilibrium prices (4) 
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6 However, the price elasticity of demand for firm   is not affected by the rival firm’s provision of 
compatibility.  
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In particular, (6) and (7) tell us that when each firm chooses the same degree of 
compatibility so that their marginal production costs are the same each other, the 
price-cost margin can be enhanced solely by provision of compatibility.   
It remains one more notable implication that (4) and (5) yield: when a market is 
subject to network externalities, unlike the literature on product differentiation suggested, 
relaxing price competition can be attained not by market segmentation nor by product 
differentiation but by making consumers not locked in a network so that they can share 
the benefit from other networks. Furthermore, although the paper adopts a horizontal 
product differentiation model, the result is related to the vertical product differentiation á 
la Shaked and Sutton (1982), since relaxing price competition can be achieved by a 
firm’s provision of compatibility which gives the direct benefit to consumers by 
increasing the network size of its product. 
Although the network size of a product is not the same as the intrinsic quality of the 
product, it can be seen that they are related each other in that they affect a level of 
consumer’s utility directly. From that perspective, the result of the paper is in stark 
contrast to Ma and Burgess (1993) who argue that a firm's quality enhancement is 
counteracted by the rival's price-undercutting reaction in the subsequent price game, 
thereby leading to intense price competition and eliminating the demand enhancing 
effect of an increase in quality. The above results of the paper are summarized in 
Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1. The equilibrium prices of (4) and (5) strictly decrease in  λ  unless 
, but strictly increase in either   or   for  all  1 = = j i α α i α j α 0 > λ . 
 
 
4.  COMPATIBILITY  COMPETITION 
 
Expecting what happens in the price-subgame, firm   chooses  i i α  maximizing its 
profit in terms of degrees of compatibility given by 
 
) (
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⎡ + + − + −
= .          ( 8 )  
 
In general, the profit function   is not concave with respect to  . Nonetheless, 
the appropriate first order conditions still will be necessary at an equilibrium. Consider 
the symmetric equilibrium in which firms’ choices of degree of compatibility and of 
prices are equivalent and their market shares are a half, respectively. Then, given 
i π i α
λ , the 
symmetric equilibrium degree of compatibility,  , is characterized by Proposition 2.    ) (
* * λ α
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Proposition 2. In the game in which firms simultaneously choose degrees of 
compatibility at the first stage and then prices at the second stage, given λ , the 
symmetric equilibrium degree of compatibility   satisfies  ) (
* * λ α
 
() (





α σ α λ ′ + ′ = C ) .                                             ( 9 )  
 
Two features are notable from (9). One is that in the symmetric equilibrium, the 
firms have a positive incentive to make their products partially compatible each other, as 
long as  )) ( ( )] ( [
2
1 * * * * λ α λ λα λ C a ≥ + − . From the comparison with (1), (9) describes 
that given  λ ,      , i.e., the excessive degree of compatibility compared 
to the social optimum. Figure 1 illustrates the determination of   and  .  
) (
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* λ α
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Figure 1.    Equilibrium and Efficient Level of Degree of Compatibility 
 
 
According to (1) and (9), it is seen that the inefficiency of degree of compatibility 
stems from the price-enhancing effect of compatibility provision. As discussed in the 
previous section, the price-enhancing effect arises both from increased marginal cost and 
from lower price elasticity of demand by provision of compatibility. However, the social COMPATIBILITY COMPETITION  157 
planner does not take into account the price-enhancing effect of compatibility provision, 
when choosing the degree of compatibility.   
This inefficiency result holds even when degree of compatibility of a product is 
determined separably. Consider a model in which degree of compatibility can be 
increased by either higher marginal cost, higher fixed cost, or both. Suppose that degree 
of compatibility is a sum of two parts, i.e.,  , and that total cost of producing 
  units of the good with 
2 1 α α α + =
Q α   degree of compatibility is  . Then, a firm 
in this model chooses both marginal and fixed costs to determine degree of compatibility. 
The socially efficient degree of compatibility,  , is derived:  , 
where   and  . In detail, when there is an increase of degree of 
compatibility, consumers’ surplus rises by 
) ( ) ( 2 1 α α σ C Q+
) (





* λ α λ α λ α + =
) ( 2
*
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 from increased network benefit, while 
the marginal production cost increases by  ) (α σ′ , and while the fixed cost goes up by 
) ( 2 α C′ , respectively.
7
Since the second-stage price competition equilibrium can be obtained as in (4) and 
(5) with this model, one can derive the equilibrium degree of compatibility in a similar 
way. It is straightforwardly verifiable that in the symmetric equilibrium degree of 
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Then, (10) can be rewritten by 
 
 
7 Note that the increased consumers’ surplus  λ
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, and the importance of network externalities,  λ .  KYOUNGWON RHEE  158 
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The first bracket of the right hand side of (11) arises from the price-enhancing effect 
created by provision of compatibility, which does not exist when the social optimum is 
derived. However, note that the second bracket of the right hand side of (11) is also 
considered for the socially optimal degree of compatibility. Thus, in the symmetric 
equilibrium, it is obtained that  ) (
5
4 * *
1 α σ λ ′ = . 
Similarly, to see the effect of provision of compatibility on the fixed costs, consider 
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Just like in the previous paragraph, the first bracket of the right hand side of (13) 
originates from the price-enhancing effect of provision of compatibility, which never 
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2 α α <
* * * α α <
λ , degree of compatibility in the market is chosen excessively to the social 
optimum both through marginal cost and through fixed cost. This result is due to the 
price-enhancing effect created by provision of compatibility, in particular, through the 
effect of increased marginal cost and the effect of network externalities on price. The 
result also implies that both of these two effects are valid for the inefficiency of degree COMPATIBILITY COMPETITION  159 
of compatibility.
8
As Ma and Burgess (1993) point out, the source of this inefficiency is the sequential 
choice of degree of compatibility and price. To see this, consider a situation in which 
degrees of compatibility and prices are determined simultaneously so that the choices of 
degree of compatibility no longer have effects on price choices. Then, firm i ’s 
maximization problem is that 
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The associated symmetric equilibrium price and degree of compatibility are given by   
 
). ( 2 ) ( 4
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It is easy to see that in this game, the symmetric equilibrium degree of compatibility 
is equivalent to the social optimum,
9 while the equilibrium price is less than that when 
firms simultaneously choose degrees of compatibility in stage one and then prices in 
stage two. Thus, it comes to a conclusion that whether or not efficiency of provision of 
compatibility is achieved relies crucially on whether or not compatibility provision 
decision affects price. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The paper takes a view that provision of compatibility is related to quality 
improvement of product subject to network externalities in that it directly increases a 
value of a product for consumers. This paper investigates why firms have an incentive to 
supply compatibility and then compare the degree of compatibility provided in the 
market with the social optimum. For the analysis, it adopts a model in which in an 
 
8 One may consider a case, for example, Digital Rights Managements, in which the cost of provision of 
(partial) compatibility is minor. Assuming that the development cost for providing compatibility is positive 
and dependent upon the degree of compatibility, this case can be correspondent to the model of this paper 
either where the marginal production cost is 0, i.e.,  ( ) 0 = i α σ , or where it is independent of provision of 
compatibility. Comparing (9) with (1), the result does not change qualitatively. This implies that as seen from 
the case of separable cost function, the inefficiency result holds unless provision of compatibility entails any 
cost at all.   
9 When price and degree of compatibility are chosen simultaneously, the first brackets of the right hand side 
of (11) and (13) are omitted, since there exists no effect of provision of compatibility on price. KYOUNGWON RHEE  160 
imperfectly competitive market, firms simultaneously choose degree of compatibility at 
the first stage and then pick price at the second stage. Furthermore, a higher degree of 
compatibility requires both a higher marginal production cost and a higher fixed cost.   
This paper finds that provision of compatibility creates the price-enhancing effect 
through the increased marginal cost effect and through network externality effect, 
hereby relaxing price competition. This in turn induces the excessive degree of 
compatibility compared to the social optimum. In addition, the paper verifies that the 
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